Efficient and Provably-secure Certificateless Strong Designated
Verifier Signature Scheme without Pairings by Meijiao Duan et al.
Tehnički vjesnik 25, 6(2018), 1801-1809                                                                                                                                                                                                       1801 
ISSN 1330-3651 (Print), ISSN 1848-6339 (Online)                                                                                                                       https://doi.org/10.17559/TV-20180910170418 
Original scientific paper 
 
 
Efficient and Provably-secure Certificateless Strong Designated  
Verifier Signature Scheme without Pairings 
 
Meijiao DUAN, Jianming ZHU, Yang LI 
 
Abstract: Strong designated verifier signature (generally abbreviated to SDVS) allows signers to obtain absolute control over who can verify the signature, while only the 
designated verifier other than anyone else can verify the validity of a SDVS without being able to transfer the conviction. Certificateless PKC has unique advantages 
comparing with certificate-based cryptosystems and identity-based PKC, without suffering from key escrow. Motivated by these attractive features, we propose a novel 
efficient CL-SDVS scheme without bilinear pairings or map-to-point hash operations. The proposed scheme achieves all the required security properties including EUF-CMA, 
non-transferability, strongness and non-delegatability. We also estimate the computational and communication efficiency. The comparison shows that our scheme 
outperforms all the previous CL-(S)DVS schemes. Furthermore, the crucial security properties of the CL-SDVS scheme are formally proved based on the intractability of 
SCDH and ECDL assumptions in random oracle model. 
 





Traditional digital signature scheme with the public-
verifiable property does not fit the requirement of various 
scenarios, such as deniable authentication, e-bidding, e-
voting. To settle this problem, Jakobsson [1] put forward a 
new concept called designated verifier signature (generally 
abbreviated to DVS). The most attractive property of DVS 
is called non-transferability, which ensures signers to 
obtain absolute control over who can verify the signature. 
In addition, the designated verifier cannot convince any 
third entity of the fact the DVS is indeed signed by the 
genuine signer. Meanwhile, a variant of DVS called Strong 
designated verifier signature (SDVS) is also proposed. 
None other than the designated verifier can verify the 
SDVS. We call this property the strongness property, 
which is usually achieved by forcing the verification 
process using the designated verifier’s secret. The 
formalized definition was first formed by Saeednia [2] and 
extended by Laguillaumie [3]. Later on, Lipmaa et al. [4] 
pointed out that most previous (S)DVS schemes [2, 5-6] 
suffer from a new-type attack named delegatability, in 
which the signer could delegate his/her signing ability to 
any third entity by transferring a common value without 
revealing the secret key. To capture this issue, the security 
notion of non-delegatability was proposed and formalized. 
Due to these unique properties above, the SDVS can help 
resolve the conflict between authentication and privacy 
protection in digital signatures, thus fit into various 
cryptographic applications and some new fields, such as 
IoT communications [7], biometric authentication and 
identity-management [8], privacy preserving cloud 
computing, the next-generation network infrastructure [9], 
and so on. 
Following Saeednia et al.’s work, many identity-based 
(S)DVS schemes were proposed [10-13]. And recently 
Shooshtari et al. [14] presented a code-based SDVS 
scheme against quantum attacks. Unfortunately, all the 
above identity-based (S)DVS schemes suffer from the 
inherent problem of key escrow in ID-based 
cryptosystems. Certificateless public key cryptography, 
which was originally introduced by Al-Riyami et al. [15], 
can address this problem. It relies on a semi-trusted KGC 
who owns the master secret key. The full secret key of 
arbitrary user was deduced from two parts: partial private 
key Di supplied from KGC, and secret value xi chosen by 
himself. Thus, it has unique advantages comparing with 
certificate-based cryptosystems and identity-based PKC, 
without suffering from the problem of key escrow.  
Motivated by this attractive feature, Huang [16] 
presented the first construction of certificateless DVS 
scheme. However, their scheme is figured out to be 
vulnerable to malicious-but-passive KGC attacks. Later 
on, some efficient short certificateless DVS schemes were 
independently designed [17-19] and claimed to be secure. 
However, most of them [17-18] still need several pairing 
operations and the previous one does not resist the public 
key replace attack. Recently, several certificateless strong 
DVS schemes (CL-SDVS for short) have been proposed 
[20-24]. Unfortunately, some of them cannot achieve all 
the security properties as they claimed. According to [25], 
the scheme in Reference [22] is insecure against the 
malicious PKC attack and public key replacement attack. 
The CL-SDVS scheme proposed in Reference [24] is 
pointed vulnerable to concrete attack which shows the 
signature is forgeable [26]. Recalling the proofs of 
previous insecure schemes [16-18, 22], we find that there 
is an inappropriate restriction in their security models of 
unforgeability. The adversary cannot query target signer or 
the target verifier to sign arbitrary message, nor to check 
the validity of any signature. With these restrictions, they 
actually ignore such a practical attack in which the 
adversary can query arbitrary signature on arbitrary 
message with respect to arbitrary signer and verifier, or the 
adversary can eavesdrop all communications between 
signer and verifier. Thus, the previous models are not 
adequately considered and essentially limit the adversary’s 
abilities. Therefore, we consider a strictly stronger security 
model in Section 4. Moreover, expensive operations such 
as bilinear pairing, pairing-based exponentiation, and map-
to-hash operations are required in all existing schemes. 
And the computation cost is still maintained at a high level.  
This paper presents a novel efficient certificateless 
SDVS scheme with shorter signature size, achieving all the 
required security properties of strongness, non-
transferability, non-delegatability and EUF-CMA against 
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both Type I and Type II forgers. The unforgeability for our 
scheme is formally proved based on Square Computational 
Diffie-Hellman (SCDH) assumption and Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) assumption in random oracle 
model, of which the SCDH assumption is equivalent to the 
CDH assumption [27].And the proof of non-delegatability 
is strictly following the formalized definition originally 
introduced by Lipmaa [4]. Furthermore, our scheme does 
not need expensive pairing operations, which are making it 
more efficient than all the existing CL-SDVS schemes 
proposed so far. Due to its security and efficiency, our CL-
SDVS scheme can be deployed in various power-
constrained applications, such as sensor networks, IoT and 
cyber-physical systems. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next 
section introduces the formal definition of certificateless 
SDVS scheme. We also describe the formalized model of 
crucial security properties, including unforgeability and 
non-delegatability. In Section 3, we propose a novel 
efficient certificateless SDVS scheme. The performance 
and security are analyzed in the next two sections. The last 
section concludes this paper.  
 
2 MODELS OF CL-SDVS SCHEMES 
2.1 Definition of CL-SDVS 
 
A certificateless strong designated verifier signature 
(CL-SDVS) scheme consists of eight algorithms shown as 
the following: 
• Setup: This PPT algorithm runs by the KGC. Taking 
the security parameter κ as input, it outputs the public 
parameters params and the master secret key msk. 
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This PPT algorithm runs 
by KGC. Taking params, msk and ID∈{0,1}* (which 
is the identity of a user) as input, it returns the 
corresponding partial private key dID. 
• Set-Secret-Value: This PPT algorithm runs by a user 
with identity ID. Taking params and ID as input, this 
algorithm randomly selects a secret value xID and 
returns to the user. 
• Set-Public-Key: This PPT algorithm runs by a user with 
identity ID. On input xID, the algorithm calculates the 
public key PKID.  
• Set-Private-Key: This PPT algorithm executes by a 
user with identity ID. On input dID, PKID and xID, this 
algorithm produces full private key SKID. 




PK ) and m∈ as input, and returns
( ), , , ,s VID S V IDSign SK ID ID PK mσ = . 
• Verify: This deterministic algorithm runs by the 
designated verifier. Taking IDV,
VID
SK , IDS, 
SID
PK ,  m 
and the purported signature σ  as input, it returns 1 
(accept)or 0 (reject). 





PK  and m as input, 
it returns a simulated signature 'σ  on m, i.e.
' Simulationσ = ( ), , , , ,V SID V S IDSK ID ID PK m  which 
should be indistinguishable from signatures 
constructed by the real signer. 
2.2 Security Model of CL-SDVS Schemes 
 
A secure certificateless SDVS scheme must achieve 
four crucial security properties: unforgeability, strongness, 
non-transferability, and non-delegatability.  
Unforgeability. This property ensures that no one can 
forge a valid CL-SDVS with non-negligible probability 
without obtaining the private key of either the signer or the 
designated verifier. Depending on the different 
capabilities, we can divide the forger in certificateless 
SDVS schemes into two types. The description and 
formalization of these forgers is given below. 
Type I Forger: Let I denote this type of forger. 
Forger I  can request public keys, and even substitute 
public keys for some values he selects, but cannot obtain 
the master key msk. Forger I simulates a normal third-
party attacker against the CL-SDVS scheme. To formalize 
the attack model, we demonstrate the following game 
performed between the challenger  and the forger I . 
• Setup: runs the Setup algorithm to generate msk and 
params. Then the forger I can obtain params, the 
identity and public keys of the singer S and the 
specified verifier V.  
• Queries: The forger I  can get access to the 
following oracles. 
o ExtrPartSK(ID): On input of any user’s identity ID, 
 produces the corresponding partial private key 
dID. 
o ExtrFullSK(ID): On input ID,  returns the 
corresponding full private key SKID. 
o ReqestPK(ID): On input ID,  returns the 
corresponding public key PKID. 
o ReplacePK(ID): The forger I  can select a 
substitutional public key 'IDPK and replace the 
original public key PKID. 
o SIGN(m, IDS, IDV): On input m with IDS and IDV, it 
responds a valid signature σ on m. 
o VER(σ , m, IDS, IDV): On input of a signature σ  on 
m with IDS and IDV, it executes the verify algorithm 
and returns True (valid) or False (invalid). 
o SIMUL(m, IDS, IDV): On input of a message m with 
designated verifier’s identity IDV and signer’s 
identity IDS, it responds a valid transcript 
simulation 'σ  on m. 
• Output: Eventually, I produces a forgery ( )* *,m σ  
with the target signer *SID  and designated verifier
* .VID  The forger I  wins this game if: 
1. Algorithm Verify ( *σ , *m , *SID ,
*
VID ) outputs 
accept; 
2. I has never queried ExtrPartSK
*( )VID or 
ExtrFullSK *( )VID ; 
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3. I has never queried ExtrPartSK
*( )SID or 
ExtrFullSK *( )SID ; 




VID ) or 
SIMUL(m, *SID , 
*
VID ) to get the signature or a 
simulated one on *m with *SID  and
*
VID ; 




SID ) or 
SIMUL(m, *VID , 
*
SID ) to get the signature or a 
simulated one on *m with *VID  and 
*
SID . 
Type II Forger: Let II denote this type of forger. 
Forger II  has access to the master-key msk, but could not 
substitute public keys. Forger II simulates a malicious 
KGC against the CL-SDVS scheme. To define the attack 
model, we demonstrate this game below performed 
between a challenger  and the forger II . 
• Setup:  executes the Setup algorithm of the CL-
SDVS scheme to generate msk and params, which the 
forger II also can both obtain. 
• Queries: The forger II  can get access to the 
following oracles, which are the same as in Game I: 
ExtrFullSK(ID), ReqestPK(ID), SIGN(m, IDS, IDV), 
VER(σ , m, IDS, IDV), and SIMUL(m, IDS, IDV).  
• Output: Eventually, II  outputs his forgery ( )* *,m σ  
with the target *SID  and
*
VID . The forger II  wins this 
game if: 
1. Algorithm Verify ( *σ , *m , *SID ,
*
VID ) outputs 
accept; 
2. II has never queried ExtrFullSK
*( )SID or 
ExtrFullSK *( )VID ; 




VID ) or 
SIMUL (m, *SID , 
*
VID ) to get the signature or a 
simulated one on *m with *SID  and 
*
VID ; 




SID ) or 
SIMUL(m, *VID , 
*
SID ) to get the signature or a 
simulated one on *m  with *VID  and 
*
SID . 
Strongness. The verification process needs to use the 
specified verifier’s secret, without which any third entity 
cannot confirm whether a signature is valid. 
Non-transferability. Given arbitrary message m and 
the corresponding signature σ  generated by the signer, it 
is computationally indistinguishable from the simulation
'σ  produced by the specified verifier. 
Non-delegatability. The signer cannot delegate 
his/her signing ability to any third entity by transferring a 
common value without revealing the secret key.  
Assume that  denotes the delegated entity by the 
real signer, who can generate a valid signature in time τ  
with a non-negligible probability ε . Then we can construct 
an efficient black-box knowledge extractor E based on 
the algorithm  . Suppose  can produce a valid 













SK ) is 




SK ) is the 
key pair of an arbitrary designated verifier. And the 
probability of succeed is ε＞r , which is related to the 
choice of the random coin toss and the hash function H. Let
m represent   with m as its input. Then by taking m  
as a subroutine, the knowledge extractor E  can deduce 
either 
SID
SK  or 
VID
SK  in expected time / ( )τ ε − r , where 
[0,1]∈r  is the knowledge error. The time cost making the 
oracle queries is negligible here. If such an E  exists, the 
CL-SDVS scheme is ( , )τ r -non-delegatable.  
 
3 PROPOSED CL-SDVS SCHEME 
 
This section presents an efficient Certificateless SDVS 
scheme without using any expensive pairing computation 
or map-to-point hash operation. Our scheme satisfies all 
the required security properties including unforgeability, 
non-transferability, strongness and non-delegatability. The 
signature length is also obviously reduced. The 
construction of our CL-SDVS scheme is as follows: 
• Setup. Let q be a finite field and / p  be an elliptic 
curve 2 3y x ax b= + +  over q , where p and q are two 
large primes. Let   be aq-order subgroup of the 
additive group of points over / p  , P be a generator 
of  , and * *1 2( ), ( ) :{0,1} qH H⋅ ⋅ →  be hash functions. 
The trusted KGC selects a random value *qs∈  and 
calculates pubP sP= . Finally, the public parameters 
params = (p, q, / p  ,  , P, Ppub, H1, H2) is released, 
and master key msk = s is kept secret by KGC. 
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract. Given a user identity 
ID, KGC computes its partial private key as follows. 
First it chooses a random value *qy∈ and sets 
IDY yP= . Then it calculates the partial private key 
1( , , )ID pub IDd y H P ID Y s= + . KGC sends IDd  and IDY  
to the corresponding user via a secure channel. The 
correctness of the partial private key can be confirmed 
by verifying YID+ H1 (Ppub, ID, YID) Ppub =dIDP. 
• Set-Secret-Value.The user with identity ID sets his 
secret value by randomly choosing *ID qx ∈ . 
• Set-Private-Key. Combining IDd  and IDx , the user 
with identity ID sets ID ID ID IDsk d x w= + =  as his full 
private key. 
• Set-Public-Key. On input params and IDx , the user 
with identity ID calculates XID= xIDP, and sets 
PKID=(XID, YID) as his public key. 
• Sign. For arbitrary message m and the designated 
verifier V, the signer S calculates the signature σ using 
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its private key 
SID SSK w=  as follows. S gets V’s 
identity IDV and public key ( , )
VID V VPK X Y= , and 
computes 1( , , )V pub V V pubH H P ID Y P= . Then S selects 
three random values *, , qt r k ∈ , calculates T tP= , 
R rP= and 
  1 ( )( )S V V Vc t w X Y H= + + +  
  2 ( )V V Vc R k X Y H= + + +  
  2 1 2( , , , , , )S Vh H ID ID m T c c=  
  ( ) modSz t r h w q= + +  
The CL-SDVS is then ( , , , )r k h zσ = .  
There is a remain issue that should be noticed. 
Before computing z in the above process, it is 
necessary to make sure 0r h+ ≠  mod q. If this 
inequation does not hold, S should re-select an 
alternative random *' qr ∈  which satisfies r'+h≠0 
mod q. Then the signature can be produced 
subsequently. 
• Verify. Given a CL-SDVS signature ( , , , )r k h zσ =  on 
message m, the designated verifier V needs to check 
whether 0r h+ ≠  mod q holds in advance. If not, V 
outputs "reject". Otherwise, it calculates 
  1( , , )S pub V S pubH H P ID Y P=  
  ( )( )S S ST zP r h X Y H= − + + +  
  1 ( )V S S Sc w T X Y H= + + +  
  2 Vc rP kw P= +  
If and only if 
  2 1 2( , , , , , )S Vh H ID ID m T c c=  
holds, V outputs accept. Otherwise, V outputs "reject". 
• Simulation. The specified verifier V with private key 
SKV=(dV, xV) can calculate a simulated signature 'σ , 
satisfying that it is indistinguishable from σ . V 
randomly selects three values *', , qz β α ∈ , and 
calculates 
  1( , , )S pub V S pubH H P ID Y P=  
  ' ' ( )S S ST z P X Y Hβ= − + +  
  1 ' ( ' )V S S Sc w T X Y H= + + +  
  2 'c Pα=  
  2 1 2' ( , , , ', ', ')S Vh H ID ID m T c c=  
  ' ( ') modr h qβ= −  
  1' ( ') modVk w r qα
−= −  
Then the simulated CL-SDVS is ' ( ', ', ', ').r k h zσ =
The correctness of the CL-SDVS scheme is proved 
following from the fact that 
( )( )S S ST zP r h X Y H= − + + +  
[ ( ) ] ( )( )S S S St r h w P r h X Y H= + + − + + +  
( ) ( )( )S S StP r h w P r h X d P= + + − + +  
( ) ( )( )S S StP r h w P r h x d P= + + − + +  
tP=  
1 ( )V S S Sc w T X Y H= + + +  
1( ( , , ) )V S S pub S S pubw T X Y H P ID Y P= + + +  
( ) ( )V S S S Vw t x d P t w w P= + + = +  
1( )( ( , , ) )S V V pub V V pubt w X Y H P ID Y P= + + +  
( )( )S V V Vt w X Y H= + + +  
and 
2 Vc rP kw P= +  
1( ( , , ) )V V pub V V pubR k X Y H P ID Y P= + + +  
( )V V VR k X Y H= + + + . 
 
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
The computational assumptions on which the security 
proof relies are briefly described below. 
Definition 1 (Square Computational Diffie-Hellman 
(SCDH) Problem): Given a q-order cyclic additive group 
 generated by an element P. On input P and aP, 
computing a2P. 
Definition 2 (SCDH Assumption): Let   be a 
SCDH-adversary who can succeed in solving the SCDH 
problem within time t with the probability of ( ).scdhAdv 
If ( ) max { ( )}scdh scdhAdv t Adv=   is negligible, the 
SCDH assumption holds in . 
Definition 3 (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
(ECDL) Problem): Let p  be a finite field,  be an 
elliptic curve defined over p . On input P and Q=aP, 
where both of them are elements on q-order group / ,p 
compute a. 
Definition 4 (ECDL assumption): For arbitrary 
polynomial time bounded adversary , the advantage of 
 ’s success in breaking the ECDLP problem is 
( ) max { ( )}ecdlp ecdlpAdv t Adv=   . If ( )
ecdlpAdv t  is 
negligible, the ECDLP assumption holds in  . 
 
Theorem 1. If the SCDH assumption holds, then our 
proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existential unforgeable 
against Type I forger under chosen message attacks in the 
random oracle model. 
Proof. Given a SCDH instance (A, B) = (aP, P), in 
which *qa∈  is an unknown random value and P∈ . 
Suppose I  be a successful forger against our CL-SDVS 
scheme. Then an algorithm   can be constructed by 
running I  as a subroutine to break the SCDH problem. 
The aim of  is to compute a2P. 
Algorithm   simulates the attack environment. And 
system parameters are published to I , in which the 
master public key is pubP A aP= = . In this formula, a  is 
the master private key and should be kept secret to  . The 
oracle queries of forger I are simulated as follows: 
• H1 (Ppub, IDi, Yi) query:   maintains a list 1
listH (initally 
empty) with entries of format <Ppub, IDi, Yi, ei>. When 
I queries the H1 Oracle with input (IDi, Yi),   
responses as below. 
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o If (IDi, Yi) already consists in list 1
listH within a 
tuple <Ppub, IDi, Yi, ei>, then   responds with 
1( , , )pub i i iH P ID Y e= . 
o Otherwise,  selects a random value *qe∈ , 
inserts <Ppub, IDi, Yi, e> into the list 1
listH  and 
returns e. 
• H2 (IDi, IDj, m, T, c1, c2) query:   maintains a list 2
listH
(initially empty) with entries of format <IDi, IDj, m, T, 
c1i, c2i, hi> and proceeds as below. 
o If a tuple indexed by (IDi, IDj, m, T, c1i, c2i) already 
appears on the list 2
listH , then   returns hi . 
o Otherwise,  randomly selects *qh∈ , inserts 
<IDi, IDj, m, T, c1i, c2i, h> into list 2
listH and 
responds with h. 
• ExtrPartSK(IDi) query:   maintains list list  with 
entries of format <IDi, Yi, di, ei > and responses to the 
queries. 
o If *i SID ID=  or 
*
i VID ID= , then abort the game. 
o Otherwise,   randomly selects *, qd e∈ , sets 
pubY dP eP= −  and inserts tuple <IDi,Y,d, e> into 
the list list ,    , ,iID Y< ⋅ >  into the list 
list , 
and <Ppub, IDi, Y, e> into the list 1
listH . Then 
returns
iIDPSK d= . 
• ExtrFullSK(IDi) query:   maintains list list  with 
entries of format <IDi, di, xi, wi> and proceeds as 
follows to respond to the queries. 
o If *i SID ID=  or 
*
i VID ID= , then abort the game. 
o Otherwise,  chooses a random *qx∈ , sets 
iX xP= , iw d x= +  and inserts tuple <IDi, di, x, w> 
into the list list . Then   searches list list  
for tuple   , ,i iID Y< ⋅ > . If such tuple exists, it 
refreshes this record with <IDi, Xi, Yi>. 
o Otherwise, it inserts <IDi, Xi, Yi> in to the list 
list . Then   returns
iIDSK w= . 
• ReqestPK(IDi) query:   maintains list list  with 
entries of format <IDi, Xi, Yi>. When I queries with 
IDi,   proceeds as follows. 
o If IDi already consists in the list list  inside a 
tuple <IDi, Xi, Yi>, then  returns ( , )
iID i iPK X Y= . 
o Else if *i SID ID= ,   randomly chooses 
*, qx y∈  
and sets X xP= , Y yP= , stores <IDi, X, Y> in list 
list , and returns ( , )
iIDPK X Y= . 
o Else if *i VID ID= ,   generates X xP= , Y =
pubdP eP−  by randomly picking 
*, , qx d e∈ . Then 
it stores <IDi, X, Y> in list list , inserts <Ppub, IDi, 
Y, e> into the list 1
listH  and returns in output 
( , )
iIDPK X Y= . 
o Otherwise,   makes an ExtrFullSK(IDi) query on 
IDi itself to refresh its list list  and returns in 
output ( , )
iID i iPK X Y= . 
• ReplacePK(IDi, Xi', Yi') query: When I  inputs (IDi, 
Xi', Yi') to replace user IDi ’s public key,  searches the 
list list to check whether an element    , , iID< ⋅ ⋅>  
exists. 
o If it does,   sets Xi= Xi', Yi= Yi' and refreshes the 
record with <IDi, Xi', Yi'>. 
o Otherwise,   inserts tuple <IDi, Xi', Yi'> into the 
list list . 
• SIGN(IDi, IDj, m) query: When I  queries with signer 
IDi, verifier IDj, and message m,   first searches list 
list for tuples <IDi, Xi, Yi> and <IDj, Xj, Yj>. If such 
tuples do not exist, it runs the above algorithms to 
generate keys for user IDi and/or IDj. Then it proceeds 
as follows. 
o If * *( , ) ( , )i j S VID ID ID ID=  or 
* *( , )V SID ID , and 
*m m= , then it returns “⊥”. 
o Else if IDi, IDj ≠ *SID  or 
*
VID ,   first finds <IDi, 
wi> in list list and <Ppub, IDj, Yj, ej> in list 1
listH . 
Then it selects *, , qt r k ∈ , calculates T=tP, 
1 ( )( )i j j j pubc t w X Y e P= + + + , 2 jc rP kw P= + and 
obtains h by making a H2(IDi, IDj, m, T, c1, c2) query. 
Finally  caculates ( ) iz t h r w= + + mod q, and 
responds with ( , , , )r k h zσ = .  
o Else if *i SID ID= , 
*
j VID ID≠  or 
*
i VID ID= , 
*
j SID ID≠ ,   first finds <IDj, wj> in list 
list
and <Ppub, IDi, Yi, ei> in list 1
listH . Then   
randomly selects *, , qz β α ∈ , and computes 
( )i i i pubT zP X Y e Pβ= − + + , 1 (j i ic w T X Y= + +
)i pube P+  and 2c Pα= . Then it makes a H2(IDi, IDj, 
m, T, c1, c2) query itself to get h and caculates 
modr h qβ= − , 1( ) modjk w r qα
−= − . Finally 
returns ( , , , )r k h zσ = . 
o Otherwise, if *i SID ID= ,
*
j VID ID= and 
*m m= , 
  knows the corresponding wj. Then it finds  <Ppub, 
IDi, Yi, ei> in list 1
listH , randomly chooses 
*, , qz β α ∈  and proceeds in accordance with the 
above process. Finally  returns ( , , , )r k h zσ = . 
• SIMUL(IDi, IDj, m) query:  queries SIGN(IDj, IDi, m) 
by itself, and returns whatever it gets. 
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• VERI(IDi, IDj, m, σ ): When I  queries with input a 
signature ( , , , )r k h zσ = ,   first confirms whether 
* *( , ) ( , )i j S VID ID ID ID=  or ( , )i jID ID
* *( , )V SID ID=  
and *m m=  holds. 
o If so, it returns “⊥”. 
o Otherwise,  searches list list  to obtain tuple 
<IDi, Xi, Yi>, and list list  for tuple <IDj, wj>. 
Here notice, if *j VID ID= , it knows the 
corresponding wj. If such tuples do not exist, it 
queries ReqestPK(IDi) and/or ExtrFullSK(IDj) to get 
them. Then it verifies whether σ is valid by running 
the Signature Verification algorithm, and returns 
the result it gets. 
 Eventually, I forges a valid signature ( , ,A BID ID
*, ( , , , ))m r k h zσ = . If * *( , ) ( , )A B S VID ID ID ID≠ ,   
outputs “⊥”. Otherwise,   finds * * *, , ,pub S S SP ID Y e< >  in 
list 1
listH . Then  executes I  again for a second run, 
while the input A=aP remain unchanged, and also keep the 
same coins used for both  and I . The difference 
between the two runnings is that  changes the method to 
answer H1 queries during the second run. Before a 
particular query of H1(Ppub, *VID , 
*
VY ),   responds the 




VY ),  responds with a new independent value 
*' qe ∈ . Subsequent queries to H1 are also reponsed by 
randomly choosing from *q . 
Applying the "forking" technique formalized in 
Reference [28],  can get another valid forged signature 
tuple *( , , , ' ( , , ', '))A BID ID m r k h zσ = , such that h≠h'. If 
I can forge a correct valid signature successfully, then it 
must request the random oracle H2 for the hash value h, and 
the input (T, c1, c2) must be correct. 
Thus   can find the pair (T, c1, c2) and (T, c1', c2'). in 
list 2
listH .  Then   computes the following values: 
1
1 1 1( ') ( ')W e e c c
−= − −  
1 * * *( ') ( )[( ) ( ' )]S V pub V pube e t w P eP P e P
−= − + + − +  
1 *( ') ( )( ')S pube e t w e e P
−= − + −  
*( )S pubt w P= +  
1
2 1( 1) ( )pubW h r zP W
−= + − −  
1 *
1( 1) [( ( ) ) ]S pubh r t h r w P W
−= + − + + −  
1 * *( 1) [ ( ) ]S S pubh r t h r w t w P
−= + − + + − −  
1 *( 1) ( 1) S pubh r h r w P
−= + − + −  
*
S pubw P=  
* 1
3 2
  ( ( ) )S pubW e W x y P
−= − +  
  * 1 *( )S S pub pub pube W P xP yP
−= − −  
 * 1 * [( ) ]S Se y e a aP yaP
−= + −  
* 1 * 2  ( )S Se e a P
−=  
2a P=  
Finally,  produces a correct answer W3 to the SCDH 
challenge. Thus, if there exists a forger I  who can break 
our CL-SDVS scheme, then there exists an algorithm who 
can solve the SCDH problem.  
Theorem 2. If the SCDH assumption holds, then our 
proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existential unforgeable 
against Type II forger under chosen message attacks in the 
random oracle model. 
Proof. Given an ECDLP instance (A, B) = (aP, P), in 
which *qa∈  is an unknown random value and ∈P  . 
Suppose II be a successful forger against our CL-SDVS 
scheme. Then an algorithm  can be constructed by 
running II  as a subroutine to break the ECDLP problem. 
The aim of  is to compute a. 
Algorithm   simulates the attack environment as 
follows. It sets msk by selecting a random value *qs∈ , 
and caculates master public key Ppub=sP. Then public 
parameters are released, and msk =s is sent to II , 
simulates the oracle queries of II .We only describe 
ReqestPK(IDi) oracle below without losing generality, 
since other oracles are essentially the same as in Theorem 
1. 
• ReqestPK(IDi) query:  maintains list list  with 
entries of format<IDi, Xi, Yi>. When II  makes this 
query on IDi,   proceeds as follows. 
o If IDi already consists in the list list in a tuple 
<IDi,Xi, Yi>, then returns ( , )
iID i iPK X Y= . 
o Else if *i SID ID= ,  generates pubY dP eP= −  by 
randomly picking *, qd e∈ , and computes X=A-Y, 
where (A, B) is the ECDLP challenge instance. Then 
it stores <IDi, X, Y> in list list , inserts <Ppub, IDi, 
Y, e> into the list 1
listH , and returns in output 
( , )
iIDPK X Y= . 
o Else if *i VID ID= ,  chooses 
*, , qx d e∈  and 
caculates X xP= , pubY dP eP= − . Then stores 
<IDi, X, Y> in list list , inserts <Ppub, IDi, Y, e> 
into the list 1
listH , and returns ( , )
iIDPK X Y= . 
o Otherwise,  makes an ExtrFullSK(IDi) query on 
IDi itself to refresh its list list  and returns in 
output ( , )
iID i iPK X Y= . 
Eventually, II produces its forgery 
* * *( , , ,S VID ID m
( , , , ))r k h zσ = .   runs   again for a second time just 
as described in the proof of Theorem 1 to get another valid 
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forgery * * *( , , , ' ( , , ', '))S VID ID m r k h zσ =  such that z≠z'. 
Then  calculates the following values: 
1( ') ( ')W h h z z es−= − − −  
1 * *( ') [ ( ) ( ') ]S Sh h t r h w t r h w es
−= − + + − − + −  
1 *( ') ( ') Sh h h h w es
−= − − −  
* * * *
S S S Sx y es es x y= + + − = +  
a=  
Finally,  produces a correct answer W to the ECDLP 
challenge. Thus, if there exists a forger II who can break 
our CL-SDVS scheme, the ECDLP problem would be 
solved.  
Theorem 3. Suppose   be a delegated signer who 
can generate valid signatures on message m∈ in 
polynomial time τ . The probability ε  that  succeeds is 
not negligible. Then the CL-SDVS scheme is ( 56 /τ ε , 
1/q)-non-delegatable under the random oracle model.  
Proof. If there exists a delegated signer  , then we 
can construct an efficient knowledge extractor E . On 
input signature σ , E can get access to   as a black-box 
oracle, and produce the private key of either IDS or IDV in 
expected time ' 56 /τ τ ε≤ . We assume ε ＞k where 
k=1/q. The probability that E succeeds is 1. 
Suppose m  be  with input m. The extractor E  
executes m twice with the same random inputs. Except  
for the responses to the hash query H2(IDS, IDV, m, T, c1, 
c2), E  executes m  step-by-step in both runnings. In the 
second running, E returns a different random value as the 
answer. However, the tuple (T, c1, c2) must be equal in both 
runnings, since it is under the hash-function H2. If both 
signatures are valid, we should have t = t', i.e. 
( ) ' ( ' ')S Sz r h w z h r w− + = − +  mod q, and 2 2 'c c= , i.e.
' 'V Vr k w r k w+ ⋅ = + ⋅  mod q. Here (r, k, h, z) is the 
signature in the first run, and (r', k', h', z'), is the signature 
in the second run, where h≠h'. 
Now we show how to extract user’s private key. If r = 
r' mod q, then ' 'h r h r+ ≠ +  mod q due to the fact that 
h≠h'. Thus we can produce ( ') / ( ')Sw z z h h= − −   mod q, 
derived from the equation ( ) ' ( ' ')S Sz r h w z h r w− + = − +  
mod q. If r≠r' mod q, one can find ( ') / ( ' )Vw r r k k= − −  
mod q derived from the equation ' 'V Vr k w r k d+ ⋅ = + ⋅  
mod q. Thus the private key ( Sw  or Vw ) is sucessfully 
extracted with probability 1.  
There is a remain issue how to generate two different 
valid signatures on m, i.e. (r, k, h, z) and  (r', k', h', z'), 
satisfying that h ≠ h' but  (T, c1, c2) =  (T', c1', c2'). Now we 
construct an algorithm Rewind to settle it. Rewind can get 
access to m  as a black-box oracle. If every request to m
is counted as one step, then Rewind runs in expected time 
56 / ε . Algorithm m  can produce a valid signature (d, k, 
h, z) with probability at least ε . The procedure is related 
to the random outputs of H2(IDS, IDV, m, T, c1, c2) and the 
random coins toss.  
To respond with the two different challenges correctly, 
we execute the prover and use rewinding. The random 
coins are supplied in the following way. First, we construct 
a matrix . The row of   is the probable random coins 
for m , while the column of  is each probable H2 value 
h. Then we probe the entries we need in  , by taking m  
as a black-box oracle. If m responds correctly, we record 
1 in the corresponding entry. If not, we record 0. The aim 
is to discover two 1’s in the same row, which is equivalent 
to finding two different valid signatures. The probability ε
equals the ratio of 1-entries in  . According to Reference 
[4], algorithm Rewind can discover the required 1 entries 
in time 56 / ε . 
Theorem 4. Our CL-SDVS scheme satisfies non-
transferability. 
Proof. By executing Sign algorithm, the signer IDS can 
produce valid signature , )( , ,r k h zσ = on arbitrary m, 
where h = H2 (IDS, IDV, m, T, c1, c2). Meanwhile, by 
executing Simulation algorithm, the designated verifier 
IDV can also compute valid signatures. For arbitrary 
probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher, it is infeasible 
to discriminate whether the signatrure is caculated by a real 
signer, or simulated by the specified verifier.  
Theorem 5. Our CL-SDVS scheme satisfies 
strongness. 
Proof. The Verify algorithm in our CL-SDVS scheme 
needs to use the private key =
VID VSK w  of the designated 
verifier. This would guarantee that any third entity cannot 
verify the validity or invalidity of the signature, without 
obtaining the corresponding private key. More precisely, 
any third party cannot distinguish the signature from a 
random string with identical length and distribution. Thus 
our proposed scheme inherently satisfies the security 
property of strongness.  
 
Table 1 Security comparison 
Schemes Strongness Unforgeable against Type I forger 
Unforgeable against 
Type II forger Non-transferability Nondelegatable Assumptions 
Our scheme Y Y Y Y Y SCDH&ECDL 
H-scheme N Y N Y N GBDH 
D-scheme N N Y Y N GBDH 
C-scheme N Y Y Y N CDH&GBDH 
Y-scheme Y Y Y Y -- CDH&BDH 
X-scheme Y N N Y -- CDH&BDH 
I-scheme Y Y Y -- -- CDH&BDH 
 
We provide a security comparison of our proposed 
scheme with known existing CL-DVS schemes (H-scheme 
[16], D-scheme [18], C-scheme [17], Y-scheme [23], X-
scheme [22] and I-scheme [21]) in Tab. 1, which 
demonstrates that most existing schemes cannot satisfy all 
the required security properties, while ours can achieve all. 
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We also provide formal security proofs of unforgeability 
against both Type I and Type II forgers, non-transferability, 
strongness and non-delegatability above. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first CL-SDVS scheme without 
pairings that provides formal security proof of non-
delegatability. 
 
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
As shown in Tab. 2, we present a performance 
comparison of the proposed CL-SDVS with H-scheme [16], 
C-scheme [17], Y-scheme [23], X-scheme [22] and I-
scheme [20]. The analysis inculdes the required 
computational cost of signing or verifying a siganature, and 
the communication cost which is measured by the signature 
length. Here we omit the cost of conventional hash 
operations and point addition operations for simplicity. 
Comparing with bilinear pairings and scalar 
multiplications, these operations are much more efficient 
and negeleted. Denote P be bilinear pairing operation, E be 
pairing-based scalar multiplication, EM be ECC-based 
scalar multiplication, EX be exponentiation in group , H 
be map-to-point hash operation, I be inverse operation, and 
"pre" be pre-computed operation. Assume the bit-length of 
group element in   is 512 bits, and the goup order q = 160 
bits. 
 
Table 2 Performance comparison 
Schemes Sign-Cost Verify-Cost Length(bits) 
Our scheme 3EM+ (2pre EM) 6 EM 4| q | = 640 bits 
H-scheme 1P +1E +1I +1H 3P +1E | q | = 160 bits 
C-scheme 1P +1E +1H 1P +1E +1H | q | = 160 bits 
Y-scheme 1P +4E +1H 1P +2E +1H 2| G |  = 1024 bits 
X-scheme 3E +1I +1H 2 P +1E+1EX+2H 2| G |  = 1024 bits 
I-scheme (2pre P )+ 3E +2EX 1P +1E 2| G |  = 1024 bits 
 
To evaluate the computational efficiency, we follow 
the experimental results made in Reference [29], which 
estimated the running time of representative cryptographic 
operations. The time for executing the bilinear piring 
operation is approximately equal to 20.01 ms, i.e. 
20.01 msPT ≈ . Similarly, 6.38 msET ≈ , 0.83 msMET ≈  ,
11.20 ms
XET ≈ . Fig. 1 shows the computational cost of 
signature creation and verification for all the compared 
schemes, while the time needed to execute the pre-
computed operations is neglected.Without using any 
expensive computations like bilinear parings,  our scheme 
is the most computationally efficient. 
 




 This paper presented the first certificateless strong 
designated verifier signature scheme without using pairing 
or map-to-point hash operations. Our scheme satisfies all 
the required security properties of CL-SDVS, that is 
unforgeability against both Type I and Type II forgers, 
non-transferability, strongness and the stronger notion non-
delegatability. The formal security proofs were based on 
the intractability of SCDH and ECDL assumptions in the 
random oracle model. Furthermore, our CL-SDVS scheme 
achieves higher efficiency and outperforms all the known 
CL-(S)DVS schemes in this literature. The signature length 
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